

INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (SELECTED PROBLEMS & ISSUES)

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Abstract

Community and later the EU development aid being focused primarily on African countries, has extended to almost all corners of developing world including countries in transformation period of the East Europe, Balkans and Central Asia. The EU made a number of agreements with its partners in developing world referring at the same time to the financial and technical aid and support for comprehensive reform programs in these countries and health care, education or infrastructure development aid. It is obvious that the key to the balanced development of some partner countries are their own efforts directed to the development, including primarily political stabilization, economic reforms or improvement in governance quality to wide extent.

Keywords: European Union, global affairs, models of EU functioning.

Introduction

European Union is an extremely important and active member of present-day international relationships. It is a world power in trade, production and scientific and technological progress field and despite many problems and shortcomings it is an example of prosperous integration, symbol of successful balanced social development and the most significant development aid donor. The EU influence on global affairs process still remains less than it could be denoted by its role in international economy. The reason

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is still limited political integration area within the EU and as a result the EU doesn't "speak one language" on the global stage, also there is a lack of proper potential, for example, in the field of use of diplomatic power for all union interests protection. The Treaty of Lisbon commencement at the beginning of December 2013 gave a chance to change such state of things and, for the EU, to become a really global player. It must be ensured by new institutions including The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

Internal and international causality of EU functioning

The end of the first decade of 21st century brought a necessity of working out of the new strategy by the European Union, which would replace the previous document defining basic provisions and goals of its foreign activity, i.e. the European Security Strategy.³ The arguments for this are numerous, first of all it points at the fact that the European Security Strategy was developed and embraced before the so called great expansion, which caused substantially the change of prospect of international order perception or relationships with the United States or Russia and also it has shifted partially the focus of union foreign activities from the Mediterranean Sea Basin and ACP countries to the post-Soviet zone. Furthermore, that document was worked out in certain political circumstances, i.e. adoption of unilateral military intervention by the US in Iraq, which affected the tone of debate about its provisions.⁴ For this reason European Council gave a mandate in 2007 to J. Solanie to prepare a guideline aimed at improving the implementation of European Security Strategy and also updating its provisions. However, that works didn't meet the expectation and despite adoption of the final Report⁵ ended in failure. This fact demonstrated the European Union wasn't able to work out the strategy paper defining the basic principles of its foreign affairs at this time. This resulted mainly from structural weaknesses of strategic thinking. It seems that the Treaty of Lisbon made here some change and appropriate institutional conditions have emerged in order this debate can take place. It would be led by High Representative who was reauthorized legally and became the kind of coordination center of union and international current of Union foreign affairs. It should be noted however that the

³ Przewodnik dla posłów i senatorów, Warsaw 2011, p. 8

⁴ *Europejska Strategia Bezpieczeństwa „Bezpieczna Europa w lepszym świecie”*, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/031208ESSIPL.pdf>.

⁵ Ch. Bretherton, J. Vogler, *The European Union as a global actor*, London 2006, p. 163

worked up document must fully include all challenges the Union faces and for that reason all respective subjects must be involved in its development, i.e. not only representatives of Member States and European Commission, but also the European Parliament and scientific, political and social environment.⁶ Besides that institutional changes emerged also definite political and international circumstances, which force the Union to start working again on the document wholly defining its place in world politics. But it is however extremely difficult task as it was evidenced by strategy adopted before, focused rather on security than on holistic dimension of role the EU has to play on the international stage. Previous negotiating problems originated first of all from strong conflict between Member States against the backdrop of relations with USA. This division has recently been fundamental for the EU functioning and specified de facto the main dispute line within it. This resulted in blocking the debates about its role on international stage, some Member States was afraid of the fact that the reinforcement of European Union will weaken transatlantic bonds and will lead to the dissolution of NATO.⁷ It seems that more and more rapidly changing geopolitical reality will force EU and its members to try to gain the autonomous international position. There are some reasons for such situation and the fundamental one is weakening of USA position on the mainland. It has its root in the fact that the administration of G. W. Bush thrust a lot of Europeans aside itself by lawless war in Iraq and other unilateral actions on international stage. Moreover, the Washington's attitude towards traditional pro-American countries of East-Central Europe caused them eventually to redefine its policy. The so-called new Europeans noticed, that besides simultaneous support for America, they are treated frivolously, in turn, presence in integral structures gives them not only the possibility of development but also possibility of influence on foreign activities of the Union, particularly in regard to the East.⁸ As the result nowadays the most of the European Union countries may be qualified for the first time as advocates of EU independent position formation on the international stage, which is the significant qualitative change. Moreover, even the Great Britain headed by D. Cameron will have to become much more skeptical towards USA, conservatives must

⁶ *Report on the Implementations of the European Security Strategy- Providing Security in a Changing World*, S407/08, Brussels 2008; http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/104630.pdf.

⁷ J. Coelmont, *A Grand Strategy: Does it Matter in the Real World?*, „Security Policy Brief”, 2010, nr 7, p. 3.

⁸ P. Żurawski vel Grajewski, *Polityka wschodnia Unii Europejskiej a interesy Polski*, [w:] J. Czaputowicz(red.), *Polityka zagraniczna Polski. Unia Europejska, Stany Zjednoczone, sąsiedzi*, Warszawa 2008, p. 29-46.

take into account the reluctance of British about military involvement on the part of USA (as it was shown by political meltdown of T. Blair) and also the fact that they form coalition with the most pro-European formation in Great Britain, i.e. Liberal Democratic Party.⁹ The next factors suggesting the autonomy of Community on the global stage in the near future are changes in America itself. Assumption of president office by B. Obama triggered that it was the first time when the politician, who doesn't treat the old continent as the key element in USA foreign policy, became the president. The first years of his tenure show clearly that the main area of interest of new administration is Pacific and Atlantic regions. This is due to the fact that exactly there the axis of global politics begin to move and the greatest challenge for Washington are concentrated there, also president personal experience may be of certain importance. Europe slowly becomes the outskirts of American foreign policy but not the one of its main stages. It caused the huge implication for the European Union, because it faced the need of making its position autonomous in the international arena. The new administration gives more and more clear signals that the EU should solve problems in its nearest ambience. But this will require some time or other to define the level of common interests by state members of EU. The third extremely important factor influencing the EU international position is economic downturn having affected almost the whole world at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century and that probably redefines the system of international relations. It is of such a great importance that European Union members try to build its position in the international arena mainly due to the so-called soft power, i.e. diplomacy, funds transfer and know-how. The economic crisis and the accompanying budget crisis in several Euro area countries resulted in the necessity to reduce expenses in most European countries. Certainly it will affect the funds directed to developing countries, and this will deprive the EU one of its most important instruments of influence. That problem becomes more and more meaningful, because the crisis has not affected equally all parts of the world. The so-called "emerging powers", namely China, Brazil, India and South Africa, pass through the economic turbulence without major problems. This resulted in three essential consequences for the Union. Firstly weakened the attractiveness of European economic and social model weakened, and thereby the possibility

⁹ A. Szostkiewicz, *David Cameron. Premier wagi lżejszej*, „Polityka”, 2010, nr 1, s. 58-59. This does not mean, however, that the British will become much more favorable to deepening of the European integration, that is best evidenced by the events regarding the budget negotiation for 2011; V. Pop, *EU budget talks collapse after MEPs seek new powers*, <http://euobserver.com/19/31274>.

of EU informal impact as a model for developing countries. Secondly the international position of the G-20 and G-2 has strengthened, and the G-8 position as the main decision-making forum in the international arena has weakened. Thirdly more and more rapidly growing China lose competition on the African continent in its policy of acquiring raw materials.

Models of EU functioning in the global arena

In preparing a new strategy which also seems to be necessary after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, it is necessary first of all to determine what the Union is like, in which the international environment it is functioning, understanding partners, and above all to answer the question, what the basic objectives of the Union foreign policy should be. It seems that to some extent the Lisbon Treaty lived up to this demand, as in Art. 21 of the TEU have been defined principles and objectives of the Union's external action, carried out both in the CFSP and Community waters. Still, more and more analysts indicate that it is necessary to prepare the strategy, defining its place in global politics. P. Vennesson, seeing precisely this problem has defined four possible roles of the European Union on the international stage that it can take in the medium and long term. Based on two variables, i.e. With respect to the US and opportunities to engage militarily in armed conflict, has identified Euro-neutralism, the Euro-Atlanticism, the concept of the EU as a superpower and the idea of the EU as a civilian power, which are a kind of ideal models appearing in discourse Europe for over 30 years.

The first one is based on the assumption that the Union should be slightly involved on the international scene, and at the same time should have relatively weak links with the United States. The main objective of the supporters of this concept is to achieve the European Union's security, understood as the security of its Member States and their citizens, through limited involvement in international relations and to focus on preserving the European social model and to stimulate internal economic development.

The second strategy, i.e. The Euro-Atlanticism, in turn assumes the maximum involvement of the International Union, but not towards building its own subjectivity, but to support for America to maintain its dominant position. This strategy allows usage of military force in order to complement the efforts carried out by Washington in different parts of the world. Advocates of this approach emphasize that the only way to maintain economic growth, European values and their identity is to bound as closely as possible with the United States and the European Union is and should remain its strong and reliable partner. This is the easiest way according to

them, because these two entities have a long history of close cooperation based on common values. This reciprocal relationship is so close that the defining of European interests depends largely on the approach taken by American politicians. Thus, European policy has a secondary role in this concept with regard to American policy on the international stage.¹⁰

The third strategy, i.e. of The European Union as a superpower, is opposite to the previous two, assumes large but self-determined involvement of EU in the international arena. This strategy assumes the autonomy and independence of the Union in its external policy, and also allows using the armed forces to pursue and to protect its interests. Such a big engagement of EU on the international stage, based on the independent position of the Union, will weaken transatlantic ties. This strategy, however, does not eliminate the cooperation with the USA, but even allows its development, but based on partnership and with a liberal share of the CSDP, gradually replacing NATO. Moreover, adherents of this strategy consider the use of force by the Union may not always be based on a UN Security Council mandate, which on the one hand, would strengthen its independence in the international arena, but on the other it would collapse existing international order. This issue is precisely the most distinguishing one, which differs strategy for the Union as a superpower from the conception of the Union as a civilian power. In the latter case, its main objective is to ensure peace and stability in the international arena through multilateral action based on the mandate of international organizations.

The main task of the Union must be promotion of democracy and human rights, as well as the progressive weakening of rigorously understood national sovereignty, which will lead to the situation when global order will be based on a network of international and regional organizations such as the UN, the International Court of Justice or the World Trade Organization. This strategy assumes a strong commitment outside the European Union, but that in the context of multilateral organizations and focusing on the development of international law. In this way, Europeans have encouraged, through their own example, to accept the so-called. Post sovereignty and the strengthening of trust and transparency in the relationship, which will lead over time to achieve international stability and peace.

¹⁰ A. W. Cafruny, J. M. Ryner, *Europe AT Bay: In the Shadow of US Hegemony*, Michigan 2007; K. Naumann, J. Shalikashvili, J. Lanxade, P. Inge, H. van den Breemen, *Towards a Grand Strategy for a Uncertain World. Renewing Transatlantic Partnership*, Lunteren 2007, p. 139-145.

Shortcomings of the strategy of the European Union as a civilian power

Significant menace to the concept of the Union as civilian power lies in the difficulties related to the coherent actions in the international arena. First of all, this comes from the fact that the basic components of this strategy are mainly costly and require such international activities that anyway can result in the armed conflict, which the EU is usually trying to avoid. In addition, the previous experience shows that too costly (in the military, political and financial sense) interventions are not undertaken, or are abandoned. As a result the strategy of the Union as a civilian power is subjected to criticism for hypocrisy arising from the inevitable compromises that rather won't present the Union as the player for coherent international actions. Moreover, it can be viable only due to the strong USA presence as the dominant military power and, as H. Bull¹¹ has pointed out in his commentaries. Consequently, the majority of its supporters does not treat the American hegemony as a serious problem and accept the fact the EU will play a role of weaker partner than Washington. This will not encourage the creation of independent international position of the EU, but it seems that the regard of this fact is essential in the development of grand strategy for the Union. It can also cause blurring of clear lines between the Union as a civilian power and Euro-Atlanticism and retention of de facto current state. However, it should be remembered that the USA position in the international arena is weakening, what can result into more partner relationships.

The second menace to the effectiveness of this strategy lies within the EU itself, i.e. rupture between the use of typical for the civilian power and superpower instruments (or also, as it is defined by B. Hettne and F. Söderbaum, soft imperialism). The first one is more inherent for such external actions areas as development and environment protection, more powerful instruments are also used towards coercion, in the field of trade and security. A similar division concern of Member States themselves and the EU institutions, where the Nordic countries much more readily than the Mediterranean refer to the instruments typical for the civilian power, DG Development is much more "civilian" than DG Trade, especially DG Relex. It is interesting that this division also occurs in different particular areas of external actions, with special emphasis on interregional relations. Concerning countries of ASEM, the European Union takes decisively the position of civilian power, but concerning the ACP countries it more often

¹¹ H. Bull, *Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction In Terms?*, „Journal of Common Market Studies”, 1982, vol. 21, nr 2, p. 149-165.

pursues its own interests, implementing the strategy of quasi-superpower (soft imperialism). Thus, it is clearly visible that the Union uses the tactic of civilian power towards the equal partners, and the tactic of superpower¹² towards the weak partners. It is interesting that, in relation to Latin America and Mercosur the European Union hasn't taken a definite position, using the instruments typical for the two concepts mentioned above, what explains the ever-changing political priorities and strategic interests integrating the two regional groupings. This inconsistency of the action strategies is so important that it may hinder building the position of a coherent force for the Union on the international scene. It can be assumed that certain mechanisms of actions, particularly within the European Commission, has been established so strongly that they are de facto included into the institutional memory of the government and will be reproduced regardless of the strategy the EU will adopt. Moreover, the creation of the European External Action Service basing on the Commission and the Council Secretariat officials as well as on the Member States diplomatic officials can transfer these differences of strategies also to this new institution. However, it seems that certain reevaluation will take place here in the direction of a coherent strategy of civilian power. Based on the assumption that the Union uses the soft superpower instruments only regarding states much weaker than itself, it can be assumed that in relations with the South American countries the partnership dialogue and diplomatic instruments will start dominating because of their consolidating international position. As for the Africa it may result in a similar process, as countries in this continent are already destined not only to European investment and support, due to the increasing involvement of China in the region. Hence, the Union, in order to retain influence in the African continent, will have to base relationships with the local countries on the instruments of civilian power, not a superpower. So changing geopolitical conditions may force the European Union to redefine its own foreign policy.

The strategy being offered has also some other essential incoherences that may have impact on its full implementation. Firstly it isn't totally clear how multilateral international system should practically guarantee safety to Europe, if the Union fails to manage to impose its policy conducting style upon other players. This may cause that the Union will be eventually found in "political vacuum", i.e. it will be ignored by the biggest players, and decisions were taken without its participation. It is so feasibly that it's not known what the Europe will look like when it comes out of economic

¹² S. Wood, *The European Union: A Normative or Normal Power?*, „European Foreign Affairs Review”, 2009, vol. 14, issue 1, p. 114.

recession. If it accepts the activity options by soft power, the economic weakness will be transferred to the political fragility in international arena. Under the underdeveloped defense capability the Union can be unable to guarantee safety to itself and can be amenable to blackmail on the part of other players. It seems this let-down can also be neutralized with already mentioned cooperation with US within NATO, however it should be also emphasized that under the adoption of civilian power strategy, it is necessarily the EU to have strong economy. Therefore, nowadays passing reforms by Member States, changes of European zone operation and Commission efficiency may have direct impact on its position in international arena under the Europe 2020 Strategy.

Secondly the strategy development based on the international organizations may cause some problems at the moment when it is difficult to carry out reforms improving their efficiency. The best example is a debate on the UN, WTO, IMF, OSCE or *European Council future*. Incapability of those organizations may discourage some states to operate within them and try to build the new international order based on some kind of directorate. The increasing significance of such forum as G-20 or attempt of real enactment of G-2 gives evidence that this menace is real. So it also seems that the pursuit of the as fast reforming of present international organizations as possible is in favor of the Union, considering they have a significant potential that can't be reflected in other cooperation structures. However, T. Renard and S. Biscop notice it will demand time and tough political decisions and G-20 would become a transitional forum acted towards cooperation till new global multilateral architecture will develop.

Therefore, it seems the Union have to engage heavily into functioning of this group but not in order to reinforce its status but to shape new scope of international cooperation within it. This in its turn is of such a big importance that allows international players to act parts enabling their self-identification.¹³

¹³ H. Bull, *Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction In Terms?*, „Journal of Common Market Studies”, 1982, vol. 21, nr 2; http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/international_neighbourhood_policy/index_pl.htm

; <http://www.dw.de/eurogrupa-t%C5%82umi-nadzieje-grecji-na-umorzenie-d%C5%82ug%C3%B3w/a-18250396>; http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/structural_reforms/index_pl.htm; http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/pdf/cwp_2015_pl.pdf

The geographical coverage of EU and Member States aid effects

The European Union takes active part in delivering the development aid to almost all corners of developing world. It comes naturally from individual aid activity of Community members and parallel aid activity of European Commission and therefore from gradual aid program of EC/EU.

At this moment each Member State in EU carries on an aid policy towards developing countries to a greater or lesser extent. Moreover, the country size, historical experience and present-day political and economic potential cause that policies are extremely differentiated, also when it is speaking about main recipients of bilateral aid. Great diversity of aid priorities of EU Member States may also be treated as positive feature. Because if from the theoretical point of view all donors focused on the Union would employ the same allocation criteria of aid means, the development financing risk of developing countries, more likely at the best political, economic and institutional indexes (so called good performers), that would mean the increasing of poverty and instability in other countries and world regions.

Today the problem of so called aid darlings, i.e. countries which are preferable by donors and as a result they derive even excess development aid and aid orphans, or countries feeling difficulties being omitted by donor community, is one of the most important points in development agenda of EU institutes. It should be also emphasized that the dimension and variety of development policies in EU show that the European aid reaches almost all parts of the developing world and covers all the areas of economic and social development, although not all the areas and fields are supported in the same extent.

In turn the development of union aid program in geographical meaning as well as in sectorial meaning was stimulated with the next agreements signed by European Community (or earlier by European Economic Community) with developing countries in the first period. In 1963 the first convention with Yaoundé about unification of 18 African countries with European Economic Community were signed, it was prolonged in 1968. From 1975, i.e. from the moment of signing the first convention with Lomé the main partner and aid recipient of EEC were African, Caribbean and Pacific group of states (ACP). During the last three decades – also as a result of integration of new members (Spain, Portugal, Greece, then Austria, Scandinavian countries and finally Central European Countries) and EU – the aid of EC/EU embraced de facto all regions of developing world, also countries being in transformation period in Western Europe/Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). At the same time it means certain marginalization of African,

Caribbean and Pacific group of states (ACP), which – although they have ties with EU, being controlled by the Cotonou Agreement from 2000 – are noted to be less active participants in EU market, and their role in the world trade is turned to be more marginal. Besides the large aid means provided by the Cotonou Agreement, the most ambitious support program for Northern-South, they failed in attempt to increase the participation of these countries in EU international trade. It comes out from the unsatisfying negotiation rate of Economic Partnership Agreement with majority of ACP states. It should be also mentioned that not only probably the poorest states (Mozambique, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Bangladesh), but also the states located not far from the EU boundaries (Turkey, Morocco) and also states taking considerable place in EU political (Iraq, Afghanistan) or economic (China, India) agenda.

Comparing in turn aid recipients of all EU (i.e. also Member States) to recipients of support of only that part of fund which reaches the community channel, it is easy to notice the geographical range of union aid is more limited and more focused on African countries. Substantially one can use only five fingers to count states of the rest regions of so called Global South (Asia and Latin America) or also states in transformation period – former communist countries of Western Europe, Balkans and Central Asia which within the 20 main recipients of development assistance rendering to the union channels. Those regions got aid first of all through the mediation of Union Member States. However it doesn't mean that African continent is less important as a recipient for EU Member States. It can be proved at least with EU council decision from year 2005 about the half of newly allocated means destination (in prospect of 2010 and 2015).¹⁴ Now however the postulate, which was formulated 4 decades ago, stating that well developed countries have to allocate 0.7% of gross national product for ODA is carried out only by some developed countries now. European Union as integrity is planning to achieve this goal only in 2015 and one can't be sure this intention will be brought out. At the same time at the beginning of the second decade of 21st century issues of development financing have to be considered within the context of hard coming out of global economic crisis, impaired economical dynamic and budget problems of the main donors, and growing needs in sphere of financing the struggle against climatic changes.

¹⁴ W. Cafruny, J. M. Ryner, *Europe AT Bay: In the Shadow of US Hegemony*, Michigan 2007; K. Naumann, J. Shalikashvili, J. Lanxade, P. Inge, H. van den Breemen, *Towards a Grand Strategy for a Uncertain World. Renewing Transatlantic Partnership*, Lunteren 2007.

On the other hand in the next few years many developing countries, mainly the poorest one, will still struggle against economic and political problems caused by three changing each other crises (food, fuel and financial), as a result their need for developing aid will most likely be higher than formerly.

Conclusions

It should be emphasized that the European Union is a new category of international player that takes part in international relationships using approach different from traditional powers' one. From the one hand it causes the EU being treated as much more constructive player in global relationships, from the other hand it creates huge problems while defining the strategy of its foreign activities. Thus, there is a strong temptation to treat it as a country or as a classic international organization, what is connected with attempt to impose upon EU the behavior models of well-known previous realities. It is also a great problem while defining the grand strategy, being a conception that was earlier attributed to the countries only. However as it seems, in light of the Union peculiarity one should consider the conception of its functioning in the international arena otherwise, noticing its strong points, as well as the lack of prospects to be a military power in the nearest future. Nevertheless one thing is undoubted – in order the Union to become a global player regardless of being treated as civilian power, normative power or soft power, real political will have to arise. The Union may become a power, but only if it wants this. Thus, the problem consists not in the lack of opportunity, but in inability to see the common interest in the European foreign policy by the Member States as it can be noticed in other integration scopes. However, it seems Europe become gradually mature for self-identification in international arena, what comes not only from dynamically changing reality but also from longstanding foreign affairs practice.

The moment has come, when the European leaders will have to give clear answer to themselves about defining the role the Union will play in the multipolar world. The answer seems to be obvious, as it is necessary rather to abandon the concept of superpower and Euro-neutrality in predictable prospect as unrealizable one. The one practicable and the easiest for implementation strategy is widely recognized strategy of Union as a civilian power. It is based on years of activity and experience being achieved in the field of development, humanitarian, ecological and peaceful aid. Certain mechanisms, ways of thinking and behavior, which will help the Union to implement the new strategy rapidly, have been already created.

For this reason, it also seems under the present weakness of the USA and relatively not strong enough position of the so-called arising powers, the EU has a chance for self-identification in the international arena that will help it to play the independent role.

Paradoxically the avoidance of decisions will also result in solution which will have negative influence on Europe; it will become the subject of activities of other countries and will probably lose the last chance to form the international order for its own benefit. Otherwise if the final organization of international environment is presently a big unknown, the best thing to do is to guide the arising changes in wishful direction.

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МОДЕЛЬ УПРАВЛЕНИЯ ХОЗЯЙСТВЕННОЙ ДЕЯТЕЛЬНОСТЬЮ ПРОМЫШЛЕННОГО ПРЕДПРИЯТИЯ MODEL OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY OF INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES

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Abstract

The model of management activity of economic in the manufacturing company exhibiting description interaction basic management subsystems have been presented. Integrated system of automatic data processing present purpose of management in the manufacturing company, with particular taking into consideration information between given off coherent subsystems have been discussed. Fundamental model of management production treat database of system with utilization of computer technique are exhibiting and meaning give off subsystems have been shown. Model of the technological endowment of utilization are build for operative drive production. Optimal strategy of a material reserves management on the base of the probabilistic model in a manufacturing company have been discussed. Finally, there have been presented the methodics of modeling and symulation of dynamic systems management in manufacturing company.

Key words: management activity, manufacturing company, optimal strategy

Аннотация

Представлена модель управления хозяйственной деятельностью промышленного предприятия экспонируя описание взаимодействия

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